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NOTE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN CRISIS:
CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER REGULATIONS AND
DEFINITIONS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Kathryn E. Gilbert*
Recent attempts to regulate Crisis Pregnancy Centers, pseudoclinics that
surreptitiously aim to dissuade pregnant women from choosing abortion,
have confronted the thorny problem of how to define commercial speech.
The Supreme Court has offered three potential answers to this definitional
quandary. This Note uses the Crisis Pregnancy Center cases to demon-
strate that courts should use one of these solutions, the factor-based
approach of Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products Corp., to define commercial
speech in the Crisis Pregnancy Center cases and elsewhere. In principle
and in application, the Bolger factor-based approach succeeds in structur-
ing commercial speech analysis at the margins of the doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
"Pregnant? Need Help? Call Us!" urge highway billboards and subway
ads across the country.' On the other end of the line are Crisis Pregnancy
Centers ("CPC"s), also known as Pregnancy Resource Centers.' CPCs are
nonprofit agencies that offer free pregnancy options counseling and related
goods and services (e.g., free pregnancy testing, family planning advice,
baby clothes) to pregnant women considering pregnancy termination.' Alt-
hough CPCs vary in the goods and services they offer, supporters and
opponents agree that their paramount, and typically undisclosed, mission is
to convince women not to have abortions.
4
Many CPCs use misleading or deceptive tactics to attract and retain the
"abortion-minded"5 and dissuade them from choosing abortion. 6 Despite
their antiabortion stance, some CPCs imply that they offer abortion services
or referrals to abortion providers by advertising in the "abortion" section of
the Yellow Pages.7 Others advertise advice on pregnancy "options," though
the only option they advise is continuation of the pregnancy.' Some attempt
to attract clients by setting up near abortion providers and copying their log-
os, hoping that women who have made an appointment with Planned
Parenthood will walk into the wrong office.9 Once the woman is through the
door, she finds a clinic-like environment full of "counselors" who may fab-
ricate or overemphasize the physical and mental health risks of abortion."°
1. See, e.g., Cecile S. Holmes, Pro-Life Campaign: Billboard Campaign Offers
Help to Women in Crisis Pregnancies, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Apr. 28, 1997), http://
www.christianitytoday.com/ct/1997/apri1287t5082.html.
2. I use the term "Crisis Pregnancy Center" rather than "Pregnancy Resource Center"
because this is the most oft-used and recognizable term. See, e.g., MINORITY STAFF OF H.R.
COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., 109TH CONG., REP. ON FALSE AND
MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RE-
SOURCE CENTERS, at i (2006) [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT], available at http://
www.chsourcebook.com/articles/waxman2.pdf (using the terms interchangeably); Nancy
Gibbs, One Woman at a Time, TIME, Feb. 26, 2007, at 22.
3. See WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at iii.
4. Id. Although each center typically does not advertise its ideological mission, the
national umbrella organizations' websites make these aims clear. See, e.g., About Care Net,
CARE NET, https://www.care-net.org/aboutus/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
5. CPCs sometimes refer to women considering pregnancy termination as "abortion-
minded." See, e.g., Thomas A. Glessner, Reaching the Abortion-Minded Client Through
Medical Services: Success Stories, AT THE CENTER, Spring 2002, http://www.atcmag.com/
v3n2/article7.asp.
6. See WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
7. Id.
8. Id. at2.
9. See Kathryn Joyce, The Clinic Across the Street, Ms., Fall 2010, at 27; The Truth
About Crisis Pregnancy Centers, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., 2 (Jan. 1, 2012), http://
www.naral.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-cpcs.pdf.
10. See WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-14; NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.C. FOUND.,
THE TRUTH REVEALED: NORTH CAROLINA'S CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS 2 (2011),
available at http://www.prochoicenc.org/assets/bin/pdfs/2011NARALCPCReport VO5-web.
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Although many CPC volunteers and clients highly value the mission of
CPCs and the services they provide, and apart from the debate over the le-
gitimacy of CPCs, some local legislators have identified a public health
problem." Among other issues, the tactics of CPCs delay women from ac-
cessing termination or prenatal services. One physician explains the plight
of her patient as follows:
[My patient, Susan,] went to a [Crisis Pregnancy Center] in downtown
Manhattan early in her second trimester, thinking that she could obtain an
abortion there. The staff told Susan that she needed an ultrasound before
the procedure. Then another ultrasound. They attributed the multiple tests
to uncertainty about how advanced her pregnancy was. Because of these
delays, Susan's pregnancy progressed into the third trimester. Susan was
32 weeks pregnant and still seeking an abortion when she consulted me at
our hospital-based clinic. I had to tell her it was no longer possible: she
was well beyond the legal limit for abortion in New York. Susan was
shocked, as the "counselor" at the CPC had assured her she could have an
abortion in the third trimester. Moreover, when I examined Susan, I found
her case straightforward-one simple abdominal ultrasound would have
dated her pregnancy easily. The CPC had no medical reason for keeping
her waiting.
12
To that end, Austin, Texas' 3; Baltimore, Maryland 4 ; nearby Montgom-
ery County, Maryland"; and New York City 6 have recently enacted
legislation that requires CPCs to post warnings to potential clients about the
pdf; The Truth About Crisis Pregnancy Centers, supra note 9, at 1, 3. The Waxman Report
cites two of the most oft-repeated myths perpetuated by CPCs, the so-called "Abortion-Breast
Cancer Link" and "Post-Abortion Trauma." On the former, see NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ABORTION, MISCARRIAGE, AND BREAST CANCER RISK 1
(2010), available at http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/fs3-75.pdf. On the
latter, see TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH & ABORTION, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, RE-
PORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 92 (2008), available at
http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf. CPC counselors may also
tell women they are "ineligible" for abortion for some false reason or encourage women to
wait for a miscarriage in the hopes of delaying access to time-limited abortion services. See
NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.C. FOUND., supra note 10, at 24.
11. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 17 § I (Mar. 16, 2011). CPC advocates have
vehemently fought negative characterizations of CPCs. See. e.g., Gibbs, supra note 2, at 26-
27; Heartbeat Int'l, New York City Speaks Out About Pregnancy Help Centers, YouTUBE (Mar.
15, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tnoBfrE3Ys.
12. Hearing Before the Comm. on Women's Issues, N.Y.C. Council (Nov. 16, 2010)
(statement of Anne R. Davis, Medical Director, Physicians for Reproductive
Choice and Health), available at http://documents.scribd.com.s3.amazonaws.com/docs/
5zh48rj9mor 1 qkg.pdf~t=1289923327.
13. AUSTIN, Tx., CITY CODE § 10-10 (2010) (amended 2012). Austin has suspended
enforcement of the ordinance in the face of a recent lawsuit. Steven Ertelt, Austin, Texas Sus-
pends Law Attacking Pregnancy Centers, LIFENEWS.COM (Nov. 11, 2011, 12:22 PM),
http://www.lifenews.corr201/t 1/tl/austin-texas-suspends-law-attacking-pregnancy-centers/.
14. BALTIMORE, MD., HEALTH CODE §§ 3-501 to -506 (2009).
15. Montgomery Cnty., Md., Resolution No. 16-1252 (Feb. 1, 2010).
16. N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 17 (Mar. 16, 2011).
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limitations of their services. The regulations vary, but they generally require
entrance or waiting room signs to inform clients whether the CPC offers or
refers clients for contraception and termination services. 7 The New York
regulation requires similar disclaimers on the CPCs' advertisements.18
CPCs have fought back, arguing that the regulations unconstitutionally
compel speech in violation of the First Amendment.' 9 The federal courts
have, so far, agreed.20 In each case, the municipalities and abortion rights
amici argued, inter alia, that the speech in question was commercial in na-
ture and thus merited less First Amendment protection than noncommercial
speech. 2' Commercial speech, unlike noncommercial speech, may be pro-
scribed on the basis that it is deceptive or misleading. 2 The courts rejected
the argument, concluding that the CPCs' speech was noncommercial, and
therefore fully protected. 23 After determining that the regulations were not
sufficiently "narrowly tailored," the courts granted preliminary injunctions
to the CPCs. 2
4
The CPC cases provide a fresh and previously unexamined lens through
which to view commercial speech doctrine, a long-disputed, notoriously
17. N.YC., N.Y, ADMIN. CODE § 20-816(f)(1) (current as of Aug. 28, 2012), available at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/LAWSSEAF.cgi?QUERYTYPE=LAWS+&QUERYDATA=$$AD
C20-816$$ @TXADC020-816+&LIST=LAW+&BROWSER=BROWSER+&TOKEN=56536113
+&TARGET=VIEW (requiring both entrance and waiting room signs). The laws require the centers
to communicate particular facts. In New York City, for example, the law requires disclosures of
whether the center offers abortion, emergency contraception, and prenatal care. That statute also
requires oral warnings to clients who call or visit, and CPCs must additionally state whether they
employ medical professionals alongside a statement that the city recommends pregnant women seek
medical assistance. Id. § 20-816(b).
18. Id. § 20-816(f)(l)(iii).
19. See, e.g., Evergreen Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 203 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). On compelled speech, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
20. Evergreen Ass'n, 801 F Supp. 2d at 209; Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 472 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012);
O'Brien v. Mayor of Bait., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 817 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd sub noin. Greater
Bait. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 683 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2012).
21. See Va, State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770-73 (1976) (suggesting that commercial speech merits less protection than noncom-
mercial speech).
22. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980). Some categories of noncommrcial speech, such as "fighting words," receive no First
Amendment protection. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942). If the municipalities had prevailed on the commercial speech argument, the courts
would have then relied on a four-part test set forth in Central Hudson to determine whether
the speech was protected. Under Central Hudson, if the speech is, first, commercial, and se-
cond, false and misleading, it merits no First Amendment protection. See Cent. Hudson, 447
U.S. at 566.
23. Evergreen Ass'n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 206; Tepeyac, 779 E Supp. 2d at 463; O'Brien,
768 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
24. Evergreen Ass'n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 208-11; Tepeyac, 779 F Supp. 2d at 468-72;
O'Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
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thorny area of First Amendment jurisprudence." Pending and future CPC
regulation cases, which will likely multiply as statutes multiply, offer courts
an opportunity to reevaluate and clarify definitions of commercial speech.26
This Note argues that the CPC regulation cases reveal inadequacy in ex-
isting definitions of commercial speech and suggests paths for improvement.
Part I argues that the CPC courts incorrectly and mechanistically applied an
arbitrary selection of two haphazard "definitions" of commercial speech
developed by the Supreme Court. Part II considers these and other defini-
tions of what constitutes commercial speech, concluding that extant
categorical definitions offer little guidance to courts. A factor-based defini-
tion, however, offers a useful alternative approach. Part III returns to first
principles, arguing that the characteristics of commercial speech that have
historically afforded it less, though some, protection under Supreme Court
jurisprudence militate in favor of using this factor-based definition rather
than categorical definitions. Part IV applies the factor-based approach to the
CPC cases, concluding that although some of the CPCs' ideological speech
might merit full First Amendment protection, their advertisements would
probably be deemed commercial and thus subject to regulation. In the CPC
cases and beyond, lower courts should follow the Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp. Court in considering a variety of factors to determine
whether speech is commercial or noncommercial rather than mechanistical-
ly applying flawed and limited definitions.
I. THE FAILINGS OF THE CORE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DEFINITIONS ALONE
This Part asserts that the Maryland and New York district courts incor-
rectly applied a rigid definition of commercial speech unsupported by
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Specifically, these courts followed other low-
er courts in confusing the Supreme Court's definition of the core of
commercial speech with its limits. Though the Supreme Court has not of-
fered comprehensive guidance on the issue, lower courts should nevertheless
consider alternative approaches.
Commercial speech doctrine is a mess. 27 Among other questions, courts
and commentators disagree on whether and how much the First Amendment
25. See infra note 27; Part II. Only one piece of legal scholarship has addressed the
CPC cases, arguing that the regulations are unconstitutional and expressing apparent support
for the work of CPCs. See Mark L. Rienzi, The History and Constitutionality of Maryland's
Pregnancy Speech Regulations, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 223, 245-51 (2010). The
Supreme Court has at least once declined to consider a case involving CPCs and commercial
speech. See Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 181 (N.D. 1986),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986).
26. San Francisco, for example, is considering adopting a similar statute. See Maria L.
LaGanga, San Francisco Takes On 'Crisis Pregnancy Centers', L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011,
http://1atimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/08/san-francisco-takes-on-crisis-pregnancy-
centers.html.
27. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 2 (2000). For a history of commercial speech doctrine and the contention that the
February 20131
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protects commercial speech. Many jurists and commentators today, includ-
ing Justice Thomas, advocate full protection for commercial speech.2 8 On
the other hand, many scholars argue that commercial speech merits no pro-
tection at all. 29 Recent decisions have varied wildly in both directions.3"
Despite heated debate about the degree of protection that commercial
speech actually does or should receive, the Court has never articulated a
singular definition, test, or set of tests for what commercial speech is.3 The
first case to recognize the concept, Valentine v. Chrestensen, held that the
First Amendment affords no protection at all to what it termed "purely
commercial advertising."3 2 The Court, however, failed to offer a definition or
characterization of commercial speech (nor, for that matter, a textual or his-
torical basis for the distinction). 3
Even while later cases afforded protection to commercial speech and
overruled Chrestensen, a singular definition remained elusive.34 In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., for
example, the Court first held that advertisements merited some protection
without defining the limits of the commercial category.35 Justice Rehnquist
dissented vigorously, lamenting the "Procrustean" and hidden new line be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech.36 This confusion persists
today.
Although there is no uniform definition for commercial speech, the CPC
courts extracted two potential definitions of the concept from seminal com-
"underlying controversies ... continue to divide the justices," see DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CON-
GRESS SHALL MAKE No LAW 49-60 (2010).
28. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's
Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1990); Rodney A. Smolla, Infor-
mation, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 777 (1993).
29. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
30. See Edward J. Schoen et al., United Foods and Wileman Bros.: Protection Against
Compelled Commercial Speech-Now You See It, Now You Don't, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 520
(2002). Compare United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (striking down a
regulation requiring mushroom growers to pay assessments for collective advertising), with
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding a similar regulato-
ry scheme for tree fruit producers).
31. J. Wesley Earnhardt, Recent Development, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Oppor-
tunity to Define Commercial Speech-Why Wouldn't the Supreme Court Finally "Just Do
ItT M "?, 82 N.C. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (2004).
32. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
33. See Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.
34. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (recognizing some First
Amendment protection for commercial speech).
35. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
36. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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mercial speech cases. The courts37 relied first on Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., in which the Court defined commercial speech as that
which "proposes a commercial transaction."38 Second, the courts3 9 invoked a
definition from Central Hudson Gas & Electricity Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, in which the Court explained that commercial speech is
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."4 The CPC courts thus asked whether the CPC engaged in speech
proposing a commercial transaction or speech related solely to the economic
interests of the CPCs and their audience. Concluding that the CPCs did not,
the courts characterized the speech as noncommercial and analyzed it under
that rubric.4
A close examination of the origin and effects of the definitions used by
the courts, however, indicates serious problems with their application in the
CPC cases. First, neither "definition" was the result of the Supreme Court
setting out to define commercial speech. In Central Hudson, the Court
struck down a state regulation categorically banning advertisements by pub-
lic utilities promoting electricity use.42 The Court held that "[the regulation]
restricts only commercial speech, that is, expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience."43 In context, the eco-
nomic interests definition indicates only that commercial speech is at least
speech that affects the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.'
From this, courts can confidently conclude only that economic interests
speech is a subset of commercial speech; the full scope of commercial
speech may well extend beyond the confines of economic interests speech.
Bolger, decided three years later, lends credence to this reading. In Bol-
ger, the Court sustained an as-applied challenge to a federal law banning
unsolicited circulars advertising contraception. 45 Youngs, a contraceptives
manufacturer, attempted to distribute informational pamphlets on sexually
transmitted infections and unintended pregnancy that also advertised its
37. See Evergreen Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 E Supp. 2d 456, 463 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012); O'Brien v. Mayor of Bait., 768 E Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D.
Md. 2011), aff'd sub noin. Greater Bait. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Bait.,
683 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2012).
38. 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. See cases cited supra note 37.
40. 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). Tepeyac, unlike other cases that use both definitions,
seemed to characterize the commercial transaction definition as a clarification of the economic
interests definition. See Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
41. See Evergreen Ass'n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 204-06; Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 463-
64; O'Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
42. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 559-61.
43. Id. at 561.
44. There are at least two ways to read this sentence, however, and the other would be
to read the "that is" as an "equals" sign. The rest of this Part explains that this second reading
is unlikely since other Court decisions support the subset reading.
45. Bolger 463 U.S. at 75.
February 2013 ]
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family planning products.46 The case explicitly identified "speech which
does no more than propose a commercial transaction" 47 as the "core" of
commercial speech, not the limit or definition of it.48 Bolger went on to find
that even though some of the speech in that case-the informational pam-
phlets-was not "proposing a commercial transaction," all of the speech
was commercial. The Court considered several factors in so finding, indicat-
ing that it considered a multifactor definition necessary to determine
whether the speech in question was commercial in nature.49 In considering
and discarding the "commercial transaction" definition, the Court demon-
strated that the definition was neither necessary nor sufficient in determining
whether speech is "commercial.""° In other words, after Bolger, even speech
that does not propose a commercial transaction may qualify as commercial
speech.
Despite the implication in Central Hudson and the clear explanation in
Bolger that courts may start, but not finish, with analysis of the "core" of
commercial speech, the courts that decided the CPC cases are not the first to
mechanistically apply the core definitions alone in distinguishing commer-
cial speech from noncommercial.51 Courts using these definitions in this
way ask (1) whether the speech proposes a commercial transaction and (2)
whether it is related solely to the economic interests of the speaker. If the
answer to either question is yes, the speech is commercial. If not, the speech
is noncommercial.
The Supreme Court, however, has given lower courts little reason to
adopt this categorical approach. The Court has repeatedly noted significant
ambiguity in what qualifies as commercial speech.52 Though the Court has
acknowledged that commercial speech may be "usually defined" as speech
that proposes a commercial transaction, that descriptive definition stops
46. Id. at 62.
47. Id. at 66 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the Court has
moved from characterizing this core as that which "does no more than propose a commercial
transaction" to that which proposes a commercial transaction. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 762 (emphasis added). This shift may indicate an expansion of what constitutes
even "pure" commercial speech. See David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of
Commercial Speech, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 359, 383 (1990).
48. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1143 (D.C. Cir.
2009); El Dfa, Inc. v. P.R. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 413 F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir. 2005);
Keene Corp. v. Abate, 608 A.2d 811, 814 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
52. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993) ("[Almbiguities may exist at
the margins of the category of commercial speech ... "); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (noting "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that
will clearly cabin commercial speech"); see also Nat Stem, In Defense of the Imprecise Defi-
nition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REv. 55, 87 (1999).
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short of declaring the limits of what constitutes commercial speech.13 More
often, the Court has characterized speech proposing a commercial transac-
tion as "pure" commercial speech, reinforcing the Bolger "core" notion.54
Most tellingly, the Court has clearly indicated that though "commercial
speech" doubtlessly includes speech proposing a commercial transaction, it
can also include more.55
Still, the lower courts could be forgiven for relying on the apparent cer-
tainty offered by the core definitions, particularly since the Court has
demonstrated its wariness in establishing the outer limits of the category.
56
The Court's opinions offer little guidance, as they often skip the question of
what constitutes commercial speech and proceed directly to the constitu-
tional analysis, relying on the "commonsense distinction" between
commercial and noncommercial speech or the parties' stipulation to the
commercial nature of the speech. 51
Conflating the "core" of commercial speech with all commercial speech
prevents lower courts from properly characterizing speech that, while not
"purely" commercial, may nevertheless be as commercial as the "impure"
commercial speech in Bolger.58 This exclusion should trouble all but the
most zealous commercial speech advocates for its capacity to preclude po-
tentially constitutional government regulation of speech. Although the
courts in the CPC cases treated the core definitions from Bolger and Central
Hudson as the only available definitions of commercial speech, even the
limited guidance offered by the Supreme Court makes clear that there are
alternatives. The next Part analyzes these and other available definitions of
commercial speech.
53. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001). But see Bd. of Trs.
of the State Univ. of N.Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989). Although the Board of Trus-
tees Court indicated that the commercial transaction definition is "the" definition for
commercial speech, at least one later case clearly indicates some speech beyond the core may
"count" as commercial speech. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,
479 n.I (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, in Board of Trustees itself, the Court ultimately
found that although not all of the speech in question proposed a commercial transaction, it was
nevertheless commercial in nature. 492 U.S. at 473-75.
54. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,340 (1986);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985).
55. See, e.g., Glickman, 521 U.S. at 479 n.1 ("[Clommercial advertising generally and
these programs in particular involve messages that go well beyond the ideal type of pure
commercial speech hypothesized in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, which would do 'no more than
propose a commercial transaction.'" (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976))); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637.
56. E.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing as improvi-
dently granted a writ of certiorari for a case implicating a novel commercial speech question);
see also Earnhardt, supra note 31, at 799; infra note 101.
57. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553 (2001); Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505 (1981) (plurality opinion).
58. See supra note 53.
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II. THE BOLGER FACTOR-BASED APPROACH:
A USEFUL AND NECESSARY ALTERNATIVE
This Part analyzes available definitions of commercial speech in terms
of logical coherence and administrability by applying them to the speech in
the CPC cases. Section II.A demonstrates that categorical application of the
core definitions of commercial speech alone offers courts little guidance in
assessing speech and yields incoherent results, particularly when used to
distinguish non-core commercial speech from noncommercial speech. Sec-
tion II.B argues that the Supreme Court's factor-based definition as set forth
in Bolger offers an administrable alternative for characterizing speech as
commercial or noncommercial beyond this core.
A. Inconsistent and Illogical Results in the CPC Cases
The commercial transaction and economic interests definitions yield in-
coherent and confusing results as applied to the speech in the CPC cases. In
applying these categorical definitions, the courts in the CPC cases conclud-
ed that the CPCs' speech was not commercial for three underlying reasons:
(1) the motivations of the speakers, (2) the potentially undesirable outcomes,
and (3) the generally ideological nature of the speech's content.5 9 Considera-
tion of each reason reveals fundamental flaws in the mechanical application
of the two definitions.
The courts in the CPC cases began their analyses with consideration of
the motives of the speakers, but the question of speaker motives raises clear
problems in the context of charitable organizations.6" One court reasoned
that a CPC was not generally proposing a commercial transaction or engag-
ing in speech related to economic interests because "the [CPC] engag[ed] in
speech relating to abortion and birth-control based on strongly held religious
and political beliefs rather than commercial interests or profit motives."61
Taken to its logical conclusion, this reasoning suggests that all nonprofit
59. The Maryland district court also concluded that even if the regulations affected
some commercial speech, such speech was so intertwined with ideological speech that the two
could not be separated. See O'Brien v. Mayor of Bait., 768 F Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D. Md.
2011), aff'd sub nom. Greater Bait. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 683
F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2012).
60. The "economic interests" of the speaker form an explicit part of the economic in-
terests definition, while the motivations of the speaker inform, at least, whether she believes
herself to be proposing a commercial transaction.
61. O'Brien, 768 E Supp. 2d at 813; see also Evergreen Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 801 F.
Supp. 2d 197, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Plaintiffs' missions-and by extension their charitable
work-are grounded in their opposition to abortion and emergency contraception."); Tepeyac
v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F Supp. 2d 456, 463-64 (D. Md. 2011) ("Plaintiff is allegedly
motivated by social concerns."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012). Alt-
hough the commercial transaction "test" does not facially suggest consideration of the
speaker's motive, the courts evidently used the two tests in tandem. See supra note 40 (ex-
plaining the Maryland district court's deliberate tandem use).
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speech is noncommercial. The Supreme Court has rejected this contention.6 2
For example, nonprofits that advertise products or services for sale may do
so to further their charitable aims rather than make a profit, but they never-
theless can "propose a commercial transaction.."63 Few would argue that
such advertisements should be free from usual advertising regulations.
More importantly, even if courts could effectively engage in the type of
speculation often required to establish a speaker's subjective motives, those
motives are often mixed. Neither the commercial transaction definition nor
the economic interests definition offers courts guidance in balancing or pars-
ing mixed motives. As Justice Stevens has noted, "[E]ven Shakespeare [was]
motivated by the prospect of pecuniary award."' Art created for both money
and the sake of creation is not "commercial" speech in the First Amendment
analysis. 65 On the other hand, the Court has made clear that an organization
that commercially advertises a good or service cannot merely "link" its good
to a political or religious issue to make it noncommercial. 66 Even if courts
are able to ascertain the motives of the speaker, the resulting categorizations
may be both under- and overinclusive.67
Further, whose motives matter most? The CPC cases perfectly illustrate
that the "economic interests of the speaker and its audience" are often diver-
gent. Undoubtedly, CPCs provide limited pregnancy services because of
their religious and/or ideological opposition to abortion.68 But their target
audience-pregnant women seeking information and services-listens for
62. See O'Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 814 n.9 (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)).
63. Id. Although some areas of the law distinguish between products and services, see,
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(k), I U.L.A. 373 (2003), no logical basis exists for distinguishing
products from services in the context of commercial speech. Indeed, the Court has treated
attorney services, for example, as subject to commercial regulation. See Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985).
64. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 580 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, "[e]conomic motivation could not be made a
disqualifying factor without enormous damage to the first amendment." Daniel A. Farber,
Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372, 382 (1979). The
Court has made clear that newspapers engage in fully protected speech, despite at least some
paid advertisements and a profit interest. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964).
66. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983). Also consider the
original commercial speech case, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The respond-
ent in Chrestensen violated a city ordinance prohibiting street distribution of advertising by
passing out a handbill advertising admission prices for visitors to his submarine. In response
to the city's refusal to allow him to dock at a public wharf, he printed a second version with
political messages on the reverse and tried again. Neither the police nor the Court was im-
pressed. Id. at 53.
67. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579.
68. See supra note 4.
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nonideological reasons.6 9 The courts considered the fact that the services
were free as militating in favor of finding the speech noncommercial.7 ° But
for women seeking pregnancy testing and other pregnancy-related services,
cost concerns are undoubtedly an "economic" factor in selecting services.71
The fact that the services are free is what makes them desirable.72 The
courts' evident failure to consider the motives or interests of the audience
does not necessarily reveal any inherent flaw with the definitions. But even
if the courts had considered the issue, the core definitions would have left
them ill equipped to deal with the problem of divergent motives.
After considering the motives of the speaker, the courts turned their at-
tention to the problem of undesirable results. They reasoned that if the mere
offering of free goods or services constituted commercial speech, churches
offering communion wine would also be engaging in commercial speech.73
Finding reduced speech protections for CPCs would, by the courts' logic,
necessarily result in finding reduced speech protections for churches and
similar organizations. Because of these undesirable results, the courts con-
cluded that the CPCs' speech must not propose a commercial transaction.74
As the CPC cases demonstrate, one of the primary problems with the
commercial transaction definition is that, in practice, it prevents a court from
classifying an offer of free goods or services as "commercial speech," even
though such a finding might be warranted in some cases. Few would disa-
gree, for example, that an advertised "free sample" should be subject to
advertising regulations applicable to similar products available for purchase.
But because courts use "proposing a commercial transaction" as a categori-
cal, in-or-out test, finding any one instance of speech "commercial" worries
courts bound by stare decisis. If this particular speech "proposes a commer-
cial transaction," very similar speech might also be "commercial." In other
words, the reasoning goes as follows: Assuming A and B express similar
messages, if A is commercial, then B is commercial, and since we do not
want B to be commercial, A must not be commercial. To protect B, courts
69. In fact, CPCs target women who have already decided that they want or are at least
considering an abortion and who may not be seeking or even be open to ideological discus-
sions of abortion. See Glessner, supra note 5.
70. See Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 E Supp. 2d 456, 463 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012).
71. At least one court considered the "commercial context" of the speech of a CPC in
determining its speech to be commercial. See Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381
N.W.2d 176, 181 (N.D. 1986).
72. For example, poverty is one of the most significant barriers preventing women's
access to prenatal services. See John L. Kiely & Michael D. Kogan, Prenatal Care, in FROM
DATA TO ACTION: CDC's PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE FOR WOMEN, INFANTS, AND CHIL-
DREN 105, 108 (Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention ed., 1994), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/ProductsPubs/DatatoAction/pdf/rhow8.pdf.
73. E.g., Evergreen Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 801 E Supp. 2d 197, 205 (S.D.N.Y 2011)
(citing O'Brien v. Mayor of Balt., 768 F Supp. 2d 804, 814 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd sub nom.
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are thus overcautious to avoid characterizing A as commercial instead of
recognizing that the problem might be with the definition itself."
The concern with overinclusiveness also animated one court's third un-
derlying concern, the seemingly ideological nature of the speech in
question. The district court in Maryland rejected the city of Baltimore's at-
tempt to analogize the regulation to regulation of other advertisements, with
the court contrasting the "highly commercial" interests affected by, for ex-
ample, attorney fee advertisements with the noneconomic interests affected
by the topics of abortion and birth control.76
Again, the lower court's attempt at categorical application of the eco-
nomic interests definition failed. First, while abortion may be an ideological
issue for most Americans, it is also a practical, often economic, issue for
women.77 Second, an abortion provider advertising services or a pharmaceu-
tical company hawking a particular brand of contraception undoubtedly
engages in commercial speech;78 Bolger itself involved a contraceptive
manufacturer's challenge to a federal prohibition on mail ads for contracep-
tion. Though the speech was related to the "ideological" issue of
contraception, the Supreme Court considered it commercial.79
Categorical application of the commercial transaction and economic in-
terests definitions thus poses two overarching problems: the Supreme Court
evidently intended these definitions to outline only the core of commercial
speech, and they are difficult or impossible to apply coherently. The defini-
tions offer no guidance to courts seeking to, first, establish the motives of
either the speaker or audience, and second, consider the mixed motives of
one party or the disparate motives of both. Further, they cause courts to be
overly cautious in characterizing speech as commercial for fear of expand-
ing the ostensibly bright lines around speech "proposing a commercial
transaction." Additionally, the definitions drive courts to separate commer-
cial speech from noncommercial speech based on specious, content-based
categories, at least in the case of contraception and abortion.
75. This dovetails with commentators' concerns regarding over- and underinclusive-
ness. See supra note 67 and text accompanying notes 64-67.
76. See O'Brien v. Mayor of Bait., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 814 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd sub
nom. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 683 F.3d 539 (4th Cir.
2012). The court was referring to Supreme Court cases characterizing attorney fee advertising
as "commercial." See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
77. Approximately one in three American women will have an abortion in her lifetime.
See GUTTMACHER INST., IN BRIEF: FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_inducedabortion.pdf. One study
found that 73 percent of the women surveyed cited an inability to afford one or more children
as a reason for pregnancy termination. See Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women
Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 110, 112 (2005),
78. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-26 (1975) (acknowledging that abortion
advertisements constitute commercial speech).
79. Bolger v.Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983).
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B. A More Administrable Alternative to the Core Definitions Alone
The factor-based definition developed in Bolger offers a workable alter-
native to the core definitions alone. In addition to setting out the commercial
transaction test, the Bolger Court offered an alternative way to define com-
mercial speech. After concluding that most of the speech in question in that
case constituted "core" commercial speech doing "no more than propos[ing]
a commercial transaction,"8 the Court observed that some of the speech also
went well beyond this core:
The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements
clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech.
Similarly, the reference to a specific product does not by itself render the
pamphlets commercial speech. Finally, the fact that Youngs has an eco-
nomic motivation for mailing the pamphlets would clearly be insufficient
by itself to turn the materials into commercial speech. The combination of
all these characteristics, however, provides strong support for the District
Court's conclusion that the informational pamphlets are properly charac-
terized as commercial speech.8
The Court thus considered several factors in its analysis of whether the
speech was commercial: (1) whether the speech was an "advertisement," (2)
whether the speech referred to a specific product, and (3) whether the
speaker had an "economic motivation" for engaging in the speech.8 2 It later
considered a fourth factor in concluding that this combination overcame any
concern that the speech in question was linked to "important public is-
sues."83 While no factor was dispositive or even necessary, each helped the
Court assess speech beyond the limits of "pure" commercial speech propos-
ing a commercial transaction.
Lower courts' insistent reliance on the core definitions is perplexing,
since, as noted in Part I, the Court has made clear that some speech beyond
the "core" of commercial speech may nevertheless be commercial, and the
multifactor Bolger definition is the only test the Supreme Court has used to
characterize speech beyond this core.84 At least where the core definitions
alone fail, courts should rely on the Bolger factor-based approach. Ideolog-
80. Id. at 66-67 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 66-68.
84. Id. The Court also often speaks of the "commonsense distinction" between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56
(1978). This conclusory characterization does not constitute a "definition," however, and the
Court typically considers other factors. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562.
85. Although some courts have questioned the continued applicability of the Bolger
definitional approach, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 710
(9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000), the Supreme Court continues
to cite the approach favorably. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
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ical or doctrinal preferences for increasing or decreasing commercial speech
protection aside, the Court has clearly expressed that the economic interests
and commercial transaction definitions are useful in distinguishing only
"pure" commercial speech.
8 6
This factor-based approach is not only strongly recommended by prece-
dent; it also offers significant administrability advantages relative to the core
definitions alone. First, where the motives of speaker and audience appear
mixed or disparate, the factor-based test allows courts to account for them
both, weighing, for instance, Shakespeare's pecuniary as well as artistic in-
terests.87 Further, the fact that no one factor is dispositive or even necessary
at least theoretically invites courts to consider disparate motives. Second,
the flexibility of the test allows courts to avoid undesirable results and over-
inclusivity problems. With a factor-based test, courts should have less
anxiety about expanding the "box" of speech "proposing a commercial
transaction." Following Bolger, courts could also consider the ideologically
charged issues of contraception and abortion alongside the practical, eco-
nomic realities of their use.
The Bolger factor-based definition nonetheless poses potential disad-
vantages. 88 In application, lower courts may treat each factor as confusedly
and as categorically as they treat the core definitions. For example, as to the
first factor, courts may treat the term "advertisement" as mechanically as
they now treat "speech proposing a commercial transaction." 9 More funda-
mentally, a worry with any factor-based test is that its flexibility offers little
notice to speakers and limited guidance to courts. A balancing test may al-
low courts to place a thumb on the scale, particularly where there are
ideological preferences in favor of affording commercial speech full or no
protection. This may be doubly true in the context of the contentious issues
of pregnancy and abortion.
410, 422-23 (1993). Courts are unlikely to abandon the core definitions altogether, but they
can work in conjunction with the Bolger definition, as in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission. Where the speech is non-core but nevertheless potentially commercial, the court
should apply the Bolger factor-based approach. See, e.g., Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Pa. State
Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 861-62 (3d Cir. 1984); see also infra text accompanying note 88.
86. Perhaps lower courts follow the Supreme Court in using the core definitions to
mask surreptitious consideration of the "social meaning" of the speech in question. See Post,
supra note 27, at 18.
87. The "advertisement" factor incorporates the listener's interests, although the Bolger
factor-based approach does not otherwise explicitly address the listener. See infra Part III.
88. See Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated Firms Ever Be Noncommer-
cial?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 389 (2011) ("This test capably distinguishes paradigmatic
examples of commercial and noncommercial speech. But it is unsatisfactory when categoriz-
ing less traditional or even mixed speech ...."). Cortez, however, does not clarify what is
meant by "unsatisfactory" nor does he cite any cases for the proposition. Further, Cortez evi-
dently does not consider the Bolger test relative to others. Lower courts that have used the
Bolger test, at least, consider its application "satisfactory." See, e.g., Am. Future Sys. Inc., 752
F.2d at 862. Even those courts that have expressed skepticism or wariness at the continuing
applicability of the Bolger test have evidently applied it without disparaging its administrabil-
ity. See, e.g., Thomas, 165 F.3d at 709-12.
89. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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None of these disadvantages is fatal. First, as demonstrated by the CPC
cases, the existing core definitions already leave speakers ill equipped to
predict whether their speech will be protected, and they provide little guid-
ance to courts.90 Further, the administrability of each Bolger factor suggests
that, if anything, some speakers and courts would have more notice as to
what kind of speech is commercial. For example, asking whether the speech
is an "advertisement," assuming that term retains its commonsense meaning,
is more straightforward than asking whether speech proposes a commercial
transaction. Additionally, the factor-based test is compatible with the current
core definitions used by many lower courts. The core definitions could form
a starting point as they did in Bolger itself.91
Finally, the fact that the Bolger definition directly confronts the question
of contentious "important public issues" suggests that the Bolger factor-
based approach is less susceptible to tacit ideological preferences than the
core definitions alone. On the one hand, this factor could serve as an invita-
tion to courts to consider ideological preferences in deeming some issues
"important" and others "unimportant." On the other, the core definitions
alone may already obscure such considerations. 92 In nodding at political or
ideological speech, generally the most sacrosanct category of fully protected
speech, this factor at least forces transparency. 93 By requiring overt
discussion of ideologically fraught issues, this factor may also incentivize
evenhanded consideration of otherwise implicit preferences.
Those courts that have applied the Bolger factors have capably used the
definition to distinguish non-core commercial speech from noncommercial
speech. In American Future Systems, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State University,
for example, the Third Circuit avoided the in-or-out strictures of the core
definitions by applying the Bolger factor-based approach.94 The court reject-
ed a challenge to a university's solicitation policy brought by a company
seeking to host Tupperware party-style events in college dorms.95 The court
reversed the lower court's holding that because the product demonstrations
90. For a survey of cases reaching disparate and sometimes contradictory results, a
problem "stemming at least in part from the Supreme Court's propensity to apply the basic
'commercial proposal' commercial speech definition more broadly and without much helpful
analysis," see STEVEN G. BRODY & BRUCE E.H. JOHNSON, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE § 2.3 (2d ed. 2012).
91. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
92. See supra note 86.
93. This factor is also reminiscent of the long-established First Amendment distinction
between content-based and viewpoint-based regulations, in that courts should consider the
content, but not the viewpoint, in assessing the presence of an "important public issue." Courts
are accustomed to this distinction. But cf Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central
Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 49, 50-51 (2000) (arguing that the Court has improperly developed and applied the con-
tent-neutrality principle).
94. See 752 F.2d 854, 862 (3d Cir. 1984).
95. Am. Future Sys, 752 F.2d at 856-58, 867.
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had educational and social value, they were noncommercial.96 With the
commercial transaction definition alone, for example, the court might have
concluded that most of the speech was educational, with a commercial
transaction proposed only at the end of the interaction. Instead, the court
held that since "the speech ... [was] essentially an advertisement" and "it
specifically refer[red] to [the company's] products, and [the company's]
motivation for engaging in the speech [was] purely economic," the speech
was undoubtedly commercial. 7 Despite the transparently commercial nature
of the speech, reliance on the nomenclature of "commercial transaction"
alone might have achieved a different and less logical result.
The factor-based definition functions particularly effectively in less
clear-cut cases. In Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., for example, the
Fifth Circuit tackled a long-running rumor, allegedly spread by Amway, that
Procter & Gamble supported or associated itself with Satanism.98 Like the
CPC cases, Amway involved an ideologically driven organization (Amway)
and an ideological issue (religion) in a commercial context.99 An allegation
of Satanism does not propose a commercial transaction, nor is it related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker or the audience. To the con-
trary, the rumor relates to religion and social mores, which traditionally are
fully protected areas of speech. But the speech in question (an internal
voicemail perpetuating the rumor that was forwarded to distributors and
which distributors then cited in fliers offering Amway products as alterna-
tives) mentioned specific products, and in that sense, was an advertisement.
The court remanded for a factual determination on the third Bolger factor-
whether commercial interests motivated Amway to spread the rumor-thus
leaving open the possibility that the speech would be deemed commercial. 100
The court's nuanced analysis would have been impossible with the core def-
initions alone.
For better or worse, many state and lower courts have carried on with
the core definitions alone, and the Supreme Court has declined to correct
them.' In terms of functionality, the commercial transaction and economic
96. See id. at 861-62.
97. Id. at 862.
98. 242 F.3d 539, 542-44 (5th Cir. 2001).
99. Sociologists have described Amway as a "quasi-religious" organization with a con-
servative political agenda. See David G. Bromley, Quasi-Religious Corporations: A New
Integration of Religion and Capitalism?, in RELIGION AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF CAPI-
TALISM: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 135, 142-53 (Richard H. Roberts ed., 1995); Rachel
Burstein & Kerry Lauerman, She Did It Amway, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1996, at 48.
100. Amway, 242 F.3d at 552.
101. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1098, cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (declining an opportunity to recon-
sider commercial speech definitions in false advertising cases). The Court's reluctance to wade
into the fray indicates that any clarification is likely to be incremental. For a sample of the
criticism of the California court's approach, see Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v. Kasky and the
Definition of "Commercial Speech", 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 64, and William
Warner Eldridge IV, Case Note, Just Do It: Kasky v. Nike, Inc. Illustrates that It Is Time to
Abandon the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 179 (2003).
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interest definitions are deeply flawed when applied beyond the "core" of
commercial speech, while a factor-based test affords needed flexibility and
nuance despite some limitations. Ease or consistency of application, howev-
er, is not the only concern that should inform adoption or rejection of the
various commercial speech definitions. Does the factor-based definition
serve the underlying rationale of drawing a line between commercial and
noncommercial speech? The next Part attempts to answer this question
through an examination of the principles that afford commercial speech
some, but limited, protection.
III. FIRST PRINCIPLES AND THE BOLGER FACTOR-BASED APPROACH
This Part considers the Bolger factor-based definition alongside the tra-
ditionally stated rationale for commercial speech protection, concluding that
the factor-based approach serves the underlying theory of commercial
speech. The Court has identified three primary characteristics that justify
and limit protection for commercial speech. The factor-based definition ca-
pably identifies speech that possesses each of these characteristics. Section
III.A argues that the factor-based approach distinguishes speech that serves
the audience interest in the free flow of information. Section III.B contends
that the test capably identifies speakers able to verify the speech. Finally,
Section III.C argues that the Bolger approach serves the rationale that a
speaker's commercial self-interest will render her speech "hardy." Consider-
ing commercial speech at this level of generality does not suggest that all
commercial speech cases should be decided by this return to first principles.
But since the definitions used by courts fail in many respects, as explained
in Part II, such a return illuminates the usefulness of the alternative factor-
based definition.
A. Audience Interest
The informational value of commercial speech is the primary justifica-
tion for affording it any protection at all."02 In moving away from the
commercial speech exception suggested or established by Chrestensen, the
Court has justified protection of commercial speech on the basis of its simi-
larities to noncommercial speech:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his in-
terest in the day's most urgent political debate ....
102. E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
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... Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the free flow
of commercial information. Even an individual advertisement, though en-
tirely "commercial," may be of general public interest." 3
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, for example, the Court struck down a
ban on advertising pharmaceutical prices, reasoning that the audience had a
significant interest in finding affordable medication. 10 The audience's inter-
est in the type of information that, for example, advertisements
communicate justifies affording commercial speech some level of protec-
tion.105
Though this rationale expanded protection for commercial speech, it is
also fundamentally a limiting principle."0 6 Commercial speech is protected
because of its similarity to ideological speech and in spite of its differences.
Unlike ideological speech, which serves a host of interests, commercial
speech is only sometimes-and then only to a certain extent-valuable. The
Court has not, for example, suggested that commercial speech inherently
furthers democratic self-governance or the fulfillment of individual poten-
tial, classic rationales for political or ideological speech protection, at least
not to the extent noncommercial speech does."0 7 The primary rationale for
protecting commercial speech thus focuses above all else on the significant
but limited interests of the listener. 1 8 Any definition of commercial speech
should serve this principle, effectively determining whether the speech in
question serves this interest.10 9
The first factor in the Bolger definition, whether the speech is an "adver-
tisement[]," 1I ° inherently serves the audience's significant-but-limited
interest in the free flow of information. The information it contains, like
prescription medication prices, is important to the audience as consumers,
but not to the audience as participants in a democratic society or as political
actors. Advertisements do not usually contain types of expression important
103. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976). For the argument that the Court overstated the value of the listener's interest in com-
mercial information, see Farber, supra note 65, at 379-80.
104. 425 U.S. at 763-64, 770.
105. For a criticism of this rationale, see Jackson & Jeffries, Jr., supra note 29.
106. Professor Halberstam, for example, has characterized the Court's interpretation of
the First Amendment to protect commercial speech only where it "enable[s] listeners to re-
ceive valuable 'information' about the market." Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech,
Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
771,775-76 (1999).
107. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). On the self-govemance theory,
see generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948). On fulfillment of individual potential, see MARTIN H. REDISH,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 21 (1984).
108. Many cases follow this pattern, considering listeners' and society's interests in turn.
See, e.g., Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977).
109. Such a consideration need not result in line-drawing between commercial speech in
the public interest and commercial speech that is less important to the public interest. See Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
110. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
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for other reasons, but if, like the contraceptive pamphlets in Bolger, they do,
the court can consider this factor alongside the fourth factor-whether the
speech pertains to an important public matter.11
At first blush, the "advertisement" factor alone seems to offer little more
than the core definitions, but the question of whether the speech is an adver-
tisement more effectively operationalizes the audience's interest than either
of the core definitions. On the one hand, the advertisement is the
paradigmatic example of commercial speech, 2 clearly covered by both the
commercial transaction and the economic interests definitions. But although
the core definitions include "advertisements," the question of whether the
speech is an advertisement offers some advantages. First, unlike the ques-
tion of whether the speech "proposes a commercial transaction," the
advertisement factor is merely one nondispositive factor among several oth-
ers. Thus, courts avoid anxiety about expanding the category of what
"proposes a commercial transaction."' '13 Further, it recognizes as commercial
speech that which does not offer a "transaction" per se but is nevertheless an
"advertisement" in which the audience interest is limited (for example,
where a store advertises a "grand opening" event or a free sample of a prod-
uct). As discussed in Part II, the inquiry is also more administrable than
asking whether the speech in question pertains solely to the economic inter-
ests of the speaker and the audience, a question the CPC courts evidently
considered unworkable, undesirable, or irrelevant.' 14
B. Speaker Verification
In addition to reduced audience interests, a primary reason for affording
commercial speech less protection than noncommercial speech is its verifia-
bility." 5 Commercial speakers are "well situated to evaluate the accuracy of
their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity" because of
their "extensive knowledge of both the market and their products."" 16 In oth-
er words, the presumptive expertise of some speakers imbues them with a
higher level of responsibility for ensuring that the speech is truthful and not
misleading. This rationale suggests that definitions of commercial speech
should consider the identity of the speaker. Courts should approach this fac-
tor cautiously, since this characteristic assumes that the commercial speaker
is speaking on a factually verifiable matter. A statement of belief, even if
111. Further, speech "does not retain its commercial character when it is inextricably
intertwined with the otherwise fully protected speech." Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 782 (1988); see also id. at 795-96.
112. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495 (1996) (using the terms
"advertising" and "commercial speech" interchangeably).
113. See supra text accompanying note 75.
114. See supra Part H.
115. This term is borrowed from Farber, supra note 65, at 385.
116. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980).
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from an expert commercial speaker, is inherently subjective and unverifia-
ble.
The second Bolger factor, whether the speech refers to a specific product
or service, 1 7 serves the verifiability rationale. A speaker talking about a giv-
en product is presumably a creator, seller, or purveyor of that product. She is
thus best placed to know whether the things she says about the product are
true." '8 Further, a statement about a product, rather than, for example, a
company's ethos, is more likely to be a factually verifiable statement. This
element thus considers the identity of the speaker without assuming, for
example, that all corporations engage in commercial speech all the time." 19
The most significant disadvantage of the product factor is not a disad-
vantage of the factor per se, but rather of the rationale. Creators and sellers
of products often face uncertainty about a product's safety or efficacy. Reli-
able, peer-reviewed studies are expensive and difficult to orchestrate. Even
where a product is repeatedly and rigorously tested, uncertainty may per-
sist. 2 ' The risks and benefits of the hormonal contraceptive pill, for
example, have flung it in and out of public favor since its creation. 2 ' This
problem, however, is with the verifiability rationale, not the product fac-
tor.122 Foundational concerns with the verifiability rationale aside, the
product factor effectively serves this rationale as part of a multifactor test.
C. Durability
Finally, courts reason that commercial speech should be afforded less
protection than other forms of speech because of its durability.
"[C]ommercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy
breed of expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by
overbroad regulation.' ",123 In other words, the same concerns about deterring
freedom of expression that might apply in the context of ideological speech
apply less readily in the commercial speech context. A speaker's
117. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). For more infor-
mation on products and services, see supra note 63.
118. Other areas of the law reflect this idea. Tort law, for example, holds all direct and
indirect sellers of an unreasonably dangerous product liable for injuries caused by the product.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
119. This conforms to current commercial speech doctrine. See, e.g., Cent. Me. Power
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 734 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Me. 1999). Much of the criticism of the
California Supreme Court's Kasky decision pertains to this concern. See supra note 101.
120. Despite ample scientific evidence to the contrary, expert scientists have defended
the health benefits of, for example, boxing, unprotected sex, and smoking. See Ian Sample,
Smoking Is Good for You, GUARDIAN, Aug. 6, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/
2003/aug/07/shopping.health.
121. See Amanda Schaffer, The Pill, a Rock Opera, SLATE (Jan. 29, 2008, 4:59 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/healthand-science/medical-examiner/2008/0l/the-pill-a-rock
_opera.html.
122. See Farber, supra note 65, at 385-86.




commercial self-interest in speaking should overcome her concerns about
suppression, so that a chilling effect is unlikely. For example, false advertis-
ing restrictions are unlikely to deter companies from advertising since they
have a profit motive to continue promoting their products up to the bounds
of regulation. By contrast, if political candidates were subject to equivalent
"false advertising" regulations, candidate debates would become obsolete.
An ideological speaker is more sensitive to speech restrictions and more
likely to be deterred from speaking at all.
The third Bolger factor, whether the speaker has an "economic motiva-
tion" for engaging in the speech, serves this "hardiness" rationale.1 24 As
discussed in Part II, mixed motives may create challenges in administering
this factor, but the economic motivation factor most explicitly serves the
underlying rationale by directly considering the economic self-interest of
the speaker.125 The more a speaker is motivated by remuneration, the greater
the chance that profit motives will overcome chilling concerns. Even if the
process of determining a speaker's motives poses some administrability
problems, the final Bolger factor reinforces this first principle.
The final Bolger consideration, whether the speech is linked to "im-
portant public issues," also serves the hardiness rationale. 26 Where even
otherwise commercial-looking speech addresses an ideologically fraught
issue, courts should handle that speech gingerly lest noncommercial speech
on that issue be stifled. As explained in Part II, however, many "important
public issues," such as contraception and abortion, are also practical, "eco-
nomic" issues for many people.' The arguable overrepresentation of cases
related to contraception and abortion in Supreme Court commercial speech
jurisprudence reflects this tension. 28 Again, however, the question is but one
nondispositive consideration, allowing courts to find, for example, that even
though contraception may be an important public issue, it is also an FDA-
approved medication available for purchase like any other product.
IV. APPLYING THE BOLGER FACTOR-BASED APPROACH TO THE CPC CASES
The CPC cases demonstrate the necessity, administrability, and utility of
the Bolger factor-based approach. First, a factor-based definition is neces-
124. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983).
125. For a criticism of the durability rationale, see Farber, supra note 65, at 385-86.
Farber and other commentators have criticized the durability rationale on the basis that the
ideological speech of a fanatic is arguably hardier than some commercial speech. Nonetheless,
courts have reasoned that commercial speakers are generally more willing than ideological
speakers to push against the limits of a regulation without responding as readily to chilling
effects. See Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) ("Since the advertiser knows
his product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little worry that regu-
lation to assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech.").
126. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68.
127. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700
(1977) (contraception advertisements); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortion
advertisements).
[Vol. 1]11:591
Commercial Speech in Crisis
sary in structuring courts' analysis of the CPCs' speech since such speech
probably falls outside of "pure" commercial speech. 129 As in Bolger, the
CPCs' speech "cannot be characterized merely as proposals to engage in
commercial transactions."' 30 The records in the CPC cases do not indicate,
for example, that the regulated CPCs sell goods or services.' 3' The colorable
commercial speech claim and the Supreme Court's clear indication that
some commercial speech exists outside "pure" commercial speech bounds,
however, requires structured analysis beyond the core.
1 31
The Bolger factor-based approach helpfully structures consideration of the
speech in the CPC cases, providing a readily administrable tool for analysis of
the CPCs' speech.1 33 Take, for example, the New York regulation.'34 The first
two factors-whether the speech in question is an "advertisement" and
whether the speech refers to a specific product-immediately highlight a cru-
cial issue: the New York CPC regulations affect significantly different types of
CPC speech. They require disclaimers on advertisements as well as on-site
warnings. 135 Where the CPCs engage in advertising (the first factor) of partic-
ular goods and services (the second factor), such as free pregnancy tests and
pregnancy options counseling, the Bolger factors militate heavily in favor of
considering that speech "commercial" for the purposes of analyzing the regu-
lation.' 36 This inquiry satisfies intuitions about what "looks" like commercial
speech: the CPCs' advertisements of goods and services appear superficially
indistinguishable from the speech of any other business. 37 As such, the adver-
tising regulations are similar to others held to regulate only commercial
speech. 3 ' Where the CPC is required to post a sign in its office indicating
whether it provides or refers for abortion services, however, the regulation is
129. See supra Part II.
130. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
131. See cases cited supra note 20.
132. See supra Part 1.
133. Because the category of CPCs includes a wide variety of organizations engaged in
many different types of speech, the question arises as to which speech to analyze. The CPC
courts and this Note consider the speech in which CPCs generally engage. See, e.g., Tepeyac
v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012).
134. N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 17 (Mar. 16, 2011); see supra text accompanying
notes 16-18.




136. At least one court found such advertisements to be commercial speech subject to
false advertising regulations. See Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d
176, 181 (N.D. 1986).
137. Except insofar as the goods and services are free. But see supra notes 60-63 and
accompanying text.




more likely to affect the CPCs' day-to-day ideological speech and thus fall
outside the scope of commercial speech.139
The third and fourth Bolger factors provide equally administrable inquir-
ies that mitigate in the opposite direction of the first two factors. The CPCs
do not have an "economic motivation" for engaging in speech, suggesting
that the "hardiness" typical of commercial speech is absent. Their antiabor-
tion, pro-childbirth agenda falls squarely within the bounds of traditionally
fully protected, ideological speech. This also satisfies intuitions about com-
mercial speech: in the privacy of the office, a CPC counselor's engagement
with a pregnant woman appears far less commercial than advertisements. 140
Additionally, the CPCs' speech is undoubtedly linked to the "important pub-
lic issues" of abortion and contraception, giving the speech an ideological
patina. Those issues are, however, also practical, economic issues for CPC
clients.' Given the underlying rationale of commercial speech doctrine,
this final Bolger factor suggests that courts handle this presumably less har-
dy speech with care. The clients' practical interests, however, likewise
suggest that this factor not be dispositive'4a Furthermore, in Bolger itself,
the Court reasoned that the commercial nature of the first three factors over-
came concerns as to the fourth factor.'43 Because the CPC advertising
regulations affect speech that directly addresses clients' practical interests
(e.g., "Access our free services!") rather than the ideological interests of
either speaker or listener, this factor militates in favor of finding at least the
advertisements to be commercial.
If the courts had characterized the CPC advertisements, but not their
in-office speech, as commercial, the regulations requiring advertising
disclaimers would be upheld, at least insofar as CPCs engage in deceptive or
misleading speech. Under Central Hudson, regulation of misleading or de-
ceptive CPC advertisements is constitutional because governments may
simply ban deceptive or misleading commercial speech outright."' CPCs
that do not offer abortions yet advertise in the "abortion" section of the Yel-
139. The regulations variously require signs on the front door and in the waiting room.
See supra notes 17-18. Since CPCs attempt to attract clients by setting up in storefronts near
abortion providers, however, there is an argument that front-door signs constitute speech more
akin to "advertising." See supra note 9. The Court has suggested that regulation of "onsite"
versus "offsite" advertisements may be constitutionally distinguishable, at least in applying
the Central Hudson test. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981)
(plurality opinion).
140. But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (holding that in-
person solicitation for legal services may be regulated more readily than generic attorney
advertisements). Ohralik is distinguishable from the CPC cases for a variety of reasons, but it
suggests that the Court is willing to consider one-to-one solicitations just as "commercial" as
printed advertisements.
141. See supra note 77.
142. The Bolger test itself rejects the notion that any one factor is dispositive. Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
143. Id. at 66-68.
144. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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low Pages, for example, engage in deceptive speech. 45 Even if the courts
found that some CPCs engaged in nonmisleading, nondeceptive advertising,
the mere potential to mislead would still require courts to sustain the regula-
tion. 146 Further, the Supreme Court has suggested that disclaimers and other
forms of compelled speech may raise fewer First Amendment concerns than
prohibitive regulations in the commercial speech context.147
The CPC cases demonstrate the necessity and utility of the Bolger fac-
tor-based test. On the one hand, the speech of CPCs is unique, in that the
ideological motivations of the speaker may vary sharply from the nonideo-
logical considerations of the listeners. On the other hand, the CPC cases are
similar to many other potential commercial speech cases. Like Amway and
American Future Systems, the CPC cases involve speech that requires nu-
anced consideration that cannot be accomplished using the limited,
categorical commercial speech definitions alone. That said, the flexibility of
the Bolger definition carries the risk of unpredictability. Although the Bolger
factors are independently administrable in the CPC cases, they still leave
courts to weigh opposing interests. That risk, however, is worth the benefit
of a nuanced, structured, internally logical inquiry that the core definitions
alone cannot supply.148 Further, each element of the structured inquiry does
provide speakers and lawmakers with some additional notice. For example,
lawmakers concerned about CPC deception could focus their attention on
regulations of CPC advertisements rather than waiting room signage since
the latter might interfere with protected speech. The Bolger definition thus
affords a finer-toothed comb than the blunt, in-or-out core definitions alone.
CONCLUSION
The Bolger factor-based definition of commercial speech, used inde-
pendently or in conjunction with definitions that identify the "core" of
commercial speech, is both necessary and more administrable than the core
definitions alone. Additionally, the Bolger definition serves fundamental
principles of commercial speech doctrine and provides helpful guidance in
the CPC cases and beyond. The CPC courts' incorrect and mechanistic mis-
application of these core definitions is representative of lower courts'
frequent confusion of "pure" commercial speech with its limits. The core
definitions yield inconsistent and illogical results, at least in the context of
the CPC cases. Since the Supreme Court has indicated that commercial
speech may exist beyond the "core," courts should use the other available
commercial speech definition supplied in Bolger. The Bolger factor-based
definition offers advantages in administrability and capably identifies char-
acteristics of commercial speech that have historically afforded it less, but
145. WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
146. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53 (1985).
147. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
148. See supra Part II.
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some, protection. The courts should integrate this definition into future
commercial speech jurisprudence.
